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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the extent and the determinants of the internationalization of 
European inventive activity, between 1990 and 2004, using an innovative method to treat 
the information contained in the European Patent Office's Patstat database.  
The observed level of internationalization of inventive activities, while being rather 
low, has steadily increased over time. The amount of collaboration between actors residing 
in different countries is assessed by means of a "gravity model", as it is familiar in the 
literature on international trade. The amount of bilateral collaboration is positively affected 
by the presence of a common language and a common border, and by the common 
participation in the European Union. Participation in the Euro Zone is also found to have a 
(marginally) negative effect. 
International collaboration is negatively affected by distance, with estimated 
elasticities that are significantly smaller than the ones that characterize international trade. 
Contrary to the rumors about the "death of distance", this effect has become stronger in 
recent years. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Almost all contemporary products are the result of some form of international 
collaboration and trade. A cell phone is a bundle of many components that, almost 
invariably, are produced in different countries. Raw materials are traded to such an extent 
that anything containing plastic or metal components is also very likely to be the result of 
international trade. As for services, the current lore on international outsourcing of back-
office routines indicates that internationalization, while not being preponderant, is certainly 
increasing. 
Innovative activities, on the other hand, are largely the result of efforts which take 
place in single countries. Almost twenty years ago, considering the patenting activities of a 
sample of big US firms, Patel and Pavitt (1991) observed that "in most cases, the(ir) 
technological activities […] are concentrated in their home country", and concluded that 
"despite being a critical resource in the global competition and performance of both 
companies and countries  […] the production of technology remains far from globalised."  
Since then globalization has certainly made inroads into this domain, thanks to robust 
increases in international collaboration of various types, to the off-shoring of many R&D 
labs, and to advances in the protection and trade of intellectual property rights.  However, 
as we will demonstrate, it is still true that innovative activities are predominantly national 
in scope. 
This paper aims to identify the determinants of the intensity of international 
collaboration in inventive activities, and what they tell us about why the degree of 
internationalization of innovative activities is still relatively low. To address this issue, 
several researchers have exploited in various ways the information contained in patent data 
(see, among others, Patel and Pavitt, 1991; Patel and Vega, 1991, and Le Bas and Serra, 
2002). The research presented here also uses patents data. While most previous studies have 
considered the patent portfolios of (multinational) firms, here we attribute patents to 
countries, by exploiting the fact that patents data provide separate information on the 
nationality of the inventors and of the applicants. If a given patent involves only people and 
organizations residing in the same country, we define it as "national".  If, on the other hand, 
at least one inventor or one applicant resides in a country different from that of the others, 
then we call the patent "international". Moreover, the presence of an important functional 
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distinction between inventors and applicants allows us to define and analyze different 
measures of internationalization. 
Patent data, as a measure of inventive output, have virtues and shortcomings (Smith, 
2005, and Griliches, 1990). Many innovations, particularly of production processes, do not 
result in any patent applications, and firms often prefer to protect their inventions by 
keeping them secret, rather than by asking for the protection afforded by patents. However, 
this limitation of patent statistics is less important when the focus is on international 
innovation, because in that case the propensity to patent is bound to be higher, given that 
trade secrets are more difficult to keep in situations where the innovators reside in several 
countries and may belong to distinct organizations. 
While not all innovations are patented, the opposite is also true - that is, not all 
patented inventions produce innovations. Patents may have very different values, and for 
each superstar patent, which introduces a very relevant and successful product or process, 
there are countless others with limited or no use. Possibly a more serious problem is the 
fact that patenting activity is increasingly just one of many strategies that oligopolistic 
firms have at their disposal. "Defensive patenting", in particular, has become a way of 
accumulating a sizeable patent portfolio to be used as a bargaining chip. Indeed, at times 
the collections of patents owned are better summarized as ammunition for lawyers, than 
blueprints for engineers. While the worst excesses of such “patent inflation” are probably 
confined to the United States, the issue is obviously a very serious one (see Jaffe and 
Lerner, 2004 for an assessment and a critique; and Archontopoulos et al, 2007 for a 
quantitative assessment of the problem at the European Patent Office (EPO)). 
One way of filtering out low-quality patents is to only consider the applications 
presented at particularly important patent offices. Another possibility is to consider "triadic 
patents", meaning all patents filed at least at the EPO, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office and the Japan Patent Office (see Dernis and Khan, 2004). Since a triple 
filing is quite expensive, it may be expected that applicants choose to incur the related costs 
only when they believe that their invention deserves it. However, this approach does not 
filter out strategic patenting activities, and in fact may achieve the opposite, since such 
strategy is more likely to address the patenting offices covering the widest markets.  
Approaches that aim to exclude low-quality patents also overlook relevant inventive 
activities. Even when they do not represent a genuine advancement of the technological 
frontier, patents hint at the presence of an absorptive capability, because learning about 
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existing technologies is an integral part of R&D activities. As Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
put it, R&D is always “innovation and learning”. For this reason, we have adopted a 
methodology that computes patent statistics inclusively, rather than selectively, by focusing 
on the (priority) applications presented at any one of the EU27 national patent offices and at 
the European Patent Office (EPO).  
We have adopted a gravity model to study the determinants of the intensity of 
collaboration between pairs of countries. The gravity model ("one of the more successful 
empirical models in economics", Frankel and Rose, 2002) has had remarkable success in 
explaining bilateral trade flows. It describes trade between two countries as increasing in 
their economic size, and as decreasing in their distance (hence the resemblance with 
Newton's gravity law). This model has been given several theoretical rationalizations, the 
first proposed by Anderson (1979).  Disdier and Head (2008) performed a meta-analysis on 
103 papers applying the gravity model and report a mean elasticity of bilateral trade with 
respect to distance of 0.9, "indicating that, on average, bilateral trade is nearly inversely 
proportionate to distance". They also show that distance effects "decreased slightly between 
1870 and 1950 and then began to rise". Besides the negative effect of distance, other 
variables have generally been found to positively determine bilateral trade, such as the 
presence of a common border, a common language, a common market, and a common 
currency area (for the latter, see Rose, 2000, and Baldwin, 2006). The gravity model has 
been also applied to describe relations other than traditional trade in goods. In particular, 
distance effects have been found in the trade of services (Ceglowski, 2006, and Kimura and 
Lee, 2006), trade through the Internet (Berthelon and Freund, 2008), knowledge flows 
through patent citations (Peri, 2005), immigration flows (for a recent example, see Lewer 
and Van den Berg, 2007), and also in fields outside economics.  
Our approach appears to have only one partial antecedent. This is described in a 
paper by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001), whose measures of R&D 
internationalization present similarities with ours, to be illustrated in the next section. 
However, apart from the fact that today almost a decade more of data is available for 
analysis, our research differs in many respects from the previous literature.  One dimension 
in which this paper is innovative is in its treatment of patent information. We dedicate 
Section 3 to a description of these important methodological aspects. In Section 4, we 
illustrate the empirical model and its econometric estimates. Section 5 discusses the results, 
and Section 6 offers our conclusions. 
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2. Measures of internationalization 
 
To present our measures of internationalization in R&D, we first briefly review 
the familiar concept of fractional counting of patents (see for example Dernis et al., 2001). 
To help make the discussion as easy to follow as possible, we use a simple fictitious 
example. We consider three countries, United Stated (US), France (FR), and Germany 
(DE), that in a given year produce a total of P=3 patents. Column I in Table 1 indicates the 
nationality of the inventors and applicants that contributed to these three inventions.  
 
Table 1 about here 
  
In order to assign patents to countries, two alternative criteria may be chosen: 
either according to the nationality of the applicant(s), or of the inventor(s). The former 
defines the "applicant criterion" and the latter the "inventor criterion". Whenever an 
application has more than one inventor or applicant, some of them coming from different 
countries, patent assignment is carried out by resorting to fractional counts. So, for 
example, patent n. 1 counts as ½ German and ½ American according to the applicant 
criterion, and ½ American, ¼ German and ¼ French according to the inventor criterion. 
Let us call piInv ,  the fraction of patent p attributed to country i according to the 
inventor criterion, and piApp ,  the analogous measure according to the applicant criterion.
2 
Column II and III of Table 1 report these measures for the three patents. For each patent 
application, the sum of all the country's contribution according to the inventor criterion has 
to be equal to 1: for each patent, 
pUSInv ,  + pDEInv ,  + pFRInv ,  = 1, where the first subscript indicates 
the country, and the second the patent. These sums are indicated in Column IV of Table 1.   
The total fractional assignment of the three patents to each country is simply equal 
to the sum of the individual assignments:  
(1)    ∑
=
=
P
p
ipi InvInv
1
 
and: 
                                                 
2  When considering the fictitious example, instead of the subscript i we will use the 
mnemonic symbol of the relevant country. Also, for clarity we omit in all cases a time subscript, 
that should always be present. 
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 (1')   ∑
=
=
P
p
ipi AppApp
1
 
They are reported in the last two rows of Table 1. For example, Germany produced 
a total of 0.75 patents according to the inventor criterion, and of 0.5 patents according to the 
applicant criterion. 
Having defined the concept of fractional counting, we proceed to develop useful 
measures to express the degree of collaboration in producing patents between (the agents 
residing in) two countries. Again, we discuss them using the fictitious example of Table 1. 
We define three concepts of internationalization of a given patent: 
Inventor internationalization (in short, InvInv): Whenever a patent has at least 
two inventors resident in different countries. All three patents in our example display this 
type of internationalization. 
Applicant internationalization (AppApp): Whenever a patent has at least two 
applicants resident in different countries. Patent 1 and 2, but not patent 3, display this type 
of internationalization. 
Inventor-Applicant internationalization (InvApp): Whenever a patent has (at 
least) one inventor and one applicant that come from different countries. All three patents 
of the example belong to this type. 
In a patent, the presence of InvInv implies InvApp – if there are two inventors 
from different countries, then it is also necessarily true that one inventor and one applicant 
are from different countries. Similarly, AppApp implies InvApp. The relation between the 
three types of internationalization is depicted in Figure 1. It indicates, in particular, that all 
international patents are necessarily of the InvApp type, and possibly also of the InvInv 
and/or of the AppApp type. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
An analysis of any shortcomings of our concepts of internationalization should be 
carried out with an eye to the alternatives available. As we mentioned in the introduction, 
there are two competing approaches to analyzing internationalization of R&D activities 
using patents data. One is by assembling a firm's portfolio: Firms are typically selected 
(also) according to their size, and this leads to problems of sample selection. We, on the 
other hand, look at patents regardless of the size or type of the applicant(s), and resort to an 
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"automatized" criterion to select international patents. The limits each approach may have  
ultimately derive from the fact that patent applications are so numerous and are not 
amenable to a case-by-case examination.  
There are two forms of international inventive effort that our approach may fail to 
detect. First, imagine that a firm owns an R&D unit in a foreign country, producing an 
invention with the help of inventors that are all resident in that same location. If, moreover, 
the applicant of the filing is the foreign subsidiary (instead of the firm’s headquarters), or a 
subsidiary located in the home country, then all the applicants and the inventors would be 
from the same country and therefore the patent application, according to our taxonomy, 
would fall into the "national" category. However, note that usually, as we will verify in the 
next section, multinational firms apply for their patents through their headquarters – thus, 
the patent in this example would fall into the InvApp type. Another case of 
internationalization that would go undetected is when two firms from different countries 
constitute a joint R&D effort in one of the two countries, or in a third country, and produce 
an invention where all the inventors are residents of the country where the jointly-owned 
firm is registered. Arguably, there should not be very many of these cases. Moreover, it is 
possible that researchers from both countries would team up in the jointly-owned entity, so 
that their patenting activities would show up as inventor and inventor-applicant 
internationalization. Also, there may be patents that we classify as international, which, in 
fact, are not. For example, a multinational corporation (MNE) could have its legal 
headquarters in one country, but most of its operations in another. In this case, its patents 
would automatically display applicant internationalization. In the next section, a careful 
analysis of a sample of international patents will lead us to conclude that, overall, the 
number of problematic cases should be quite limited. 
 
Having discussed the general concepts of Inventor, Applicant, and Inventor-
Applicant internationalization, we now proceed to define the related measures, starting with 
the first one. For each patent, the strength of the relation between inventors in country i and 
j is expressed as the product of the attribution of that patent to the two countries: 
 
(2)    jpipijp InvInvInvInv ⋅=  
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This measure attributes a greater weight to collaborations where the two countries 
have more similar weights. So, for example, the collaboration between the US and France 
is equal to ½ · ¼ = 1/8 in patent n. 1 (where there are 1 French and 2 American inventors) 
and to ½ · ½ in patent 3 (where the total number of inventors, 2, is equally divided between 
the US and France. In fact, if i is different from j, 4/10 ≤≤ ijpInvInv , where the upper bound 
is reached when the total number of inventors is equally divided between two countries, 
and the lower limit applies when a patent is national. 
The aggregate strength of the relation between the inventors of two countries is 
defined as the sum of the above, over all patents: 
 
3)     ∑
=
=
P
p
ijpij InvInvInv
1
 
 
Below, we report the values for all the combinations of the three patents in Table 
1, where for clarity, instead of the indexes i and j, the acronyms of the countries are 
employed.  
5.05.05.0005.05.0, =⋅+⋅+⋅=USUSInvInv   
125.000005.025.0, =⋅+⋅+⋅=DEUSInvInv  
375.05.05.0005.025.0, =⋅+⋅+⋅=FRUSInvInv  
 
The top part of Table 2 shows the values of these interactions for all three cases. 
Note that jiij InvInv =  (the order of the countries is irrelevant). Using (1), it is easy to see 
that:  
 
(4)   
j
N
i
ij InvInvInv =∑
=1
  and    
i
N
j
ij InvInvInv =∑
=1
 
 
For example, as predicted by (4): 
USFRUSDEUSUSUS InvInvInvInvInvInvInv ==++=++ 1375.0125.05.0,,,  
These sums are reported for all three countries in the last column and in the last rows of the 
top part of Table 2, and correspond to the values reported in Table 1. They show that the 
country patent portfolio, assigned according to the inventor criterion, may be expressed as a 
sum of pairwise measures of country inventive collaboration (InvInvij). 
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The measure of applicant internationalization is constructed along the same lines, 
and the following formulae hold: 
 
(2')      jpipijp AppAppApp ⋅=  
(3')      ∑
=
=
P
p
ijpij AppApp
1
 
(4')      
i
N
j
ij AppApp =∑
=1
 and 
j
N
i
ij AppApp =∑
=1
 
 
All computations for this case are shown in the middle part of Table 2. Note that 
jiij AppApp =  (again, the order of the countries is irrelevant). Equation (4') allows us to 
express a country patent portfolio, according to the applicant criterion, as a sum of 
interactions between applicants in different countries. The values reported in the last 
column and row of the middle part of Table 2 correspond to those of Table 1. 
 
We construct a measure of Inventor-Applicant internationalization similarly. The 
strength of the collaboration between inventors in country i and applicants in country j, for 
a single patent p, is defined as: 
 
(5) ijpijpijp AppInvInvapp ⋅=  
 
Summing over patents provides a measure of the strength of the overall 
collaboration between country i inventors and country j applicants: 
 
(6) ∑
=
⋅=
P
p
ijpijpij AppInvInvapp
1
 
 
These measures aggregate to the patent attributed to a country either according to 
the inventor, or to the applicant criterion, depending on whether the summation is over i, or 
over j: 
(7)    
i
ij
N
j
InvInvapp =∑
=1
 
(7')    
j
ij
N
i
AppInvapp =∑
=1
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The bottom part of Table 2 indicates all computations for our fictitious example. 
Note that ijInvApp  generally differs from jiInvApp . 
 
The quantities defined in (3), (3’) and (6) are the three measures of 
internationalization of innovative activities that we will assess in Section 4 using a gravity 
model. In the next section, in order to provide a first description of the degree of 
internationalization, we will use relative measures of internationalization, expressed as a 
share of the total number of patents. It is straightforward to construct relative measures of 
(3) and (3’): 
(8)     iijiij InvInvInv /=          
 and     
(8')   iijiij AppAppApp /=  
where  1
1
=∑
= iij
N
j
Inv   and   1
1
=∑
= iij
N
j
App . 
There are in fact two conditional measures of inventor-applicant 
internationalization, depending on whether the normalization is carried out with respect to 
the inventors of country i, or to the applicants of country j: 
  
(9)    iijiij InvInvappInvapp /=  
(9')    jijjij AppInvappInvapp /=  
 
where  1
1
=∑
= iij
N
j
Invapp   and   1
1
=∑
= jij
N
i
Invapp . 
 
Our metrics of relative internationalization have similarities with those of Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001), who adopt three measures that they call SHAI, 
SHIA, and SHII. The first one is similar to our   iijiij InvInvappInvapp /=  , the second to 
jijjij AppInvappInvapp /= , and the third to iijiij InvInvInv /= . Our iijiij AppAppApp /=  has no 
analogue in their paper. There are, however, several differences in the way that the 
measures are constructed, perhaps the main one being that, here, fractional counts of 
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patents lead to counting as "more international" those patents where international 
collaboration is more pronounced. One advantage of our measures is that they are coherent 
with the concept of fractional counting, in that they allow us to express country patent 
counts as sums of pairwise internationalization linkages (equations 4, 4’, 7 and 7’). The 
measures adopted by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001), on the other 
hand, do not make this distinction, and consider alike all patents where there is at least 
some international collaboration of a given type. Similar considerations hold for the patent 
statistics of internationalization presented in OECD (2008). 
 
3. The data 
 
We consider patent applications, not granted patents. This choice, besides being a 
common practice in the literature, has the advantage of allowing an analysis of more recent 
data, considering that several years typically elapse between the filing and the granting of a 
patent. The source of the data is the Patstat database, based on the EPO's "master 
bibliographic database DocDB" (European Patent Office, 2008a and 2008b). It covers data 
from more than 80 patent offices and contains a wealth of information on individual filings, 
including the identity and country of residence of applicants and inventors (European 
Patent Office, 2008b). An important and innovative characteristic of Patstat is that it allows 
the identification of patent applications that claim the right to priority (that is, it permits us 
to distinguish between multiple applications for the same inventions in several patent 
offices). We take full advantage of this characteristic and we only consider "priority" 
applications. Excluding all other applications allows us to assess only those filings that 
reflect true inventive activity that is centered in the geographic area of interest – in our case, 
the European Union. 
Most studies on patents only use information from a single patent office. Given 
our focus on the internationalization of patents, this approach would not be viable, because 
the presence of the "home bias effect" would vitiate any study based on a single, even if 
very important, national patent office. For this reason, we consider applications filed in any 
one of the patent offices of a member state of the European Union (in its current 
configuration of 27 States, EU27), or at the EPO. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2001) and OECD (2008) focus their attention on the filings to the EPO only, a 
strategy that rests on its continental scope. However, such a choice also is questionable, for 
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two reasons. First, many European patents never reach the EPO as priority filings, or as 
successive applications. Secondly, the decision to file to the EPO is influenced by factors 
that are country-dependent. In particular, agents from smaller countries, which have been 
members of the EPO for longer and whose national patent offices have higher filing fees, 
have a higher propensity to use that institution (De Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie, 2007).3 The two reasons together imply that only focusing on the EPO may induce 
biased estimates. 
We would like to obtain a better understanding of the nature of the patent 
applications that we characterize as "international". Their sheer quantity (a total of 72,291 
patents) makes it impossible to carry out a case-by-case analysis. As a compromise between 
what would be desirable, and what can reasonably be achieved, we selected, out of the 
population of 72,291 international patent applications, a stratified random sample of 300 
patents, with proportional allocation in the year variable. For each one of them, we 
determined the type of applicant(s), according to the following classification. 
"Multinational Enterprises" (MNEs) are firms that control at least one production 
unit in a country different from where they are based. A distinction is made between 
headquarters (HC) and subsidiaries (SUB). Also, subsidiaries that are registered in the same 
countries as the headquarters are recorded separately. "Firms" are all firms that are not (part 
of) a MNE. "Universities" include all universities, and "Public research institutes" are 
research institutions that are primarily financed by public administrations (in all cases 
considered, they are also publicly owned, and clearly public in nature).4  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
                                                 
3  Using data from the EPO only (or from one or few national patent offices, as in the triadic 
approach) was also a matter of convenience and, until some time ago, it was almost unavoidable. 
With the maturity of the Patstat database, better alternatives have become available.  
4  The necessary information have been collected mainly through the Internet, taking 
advantage of the fact that most sites of MNEs report fairly accurate details of their organizational 
structure and of their history. We also used the Amadeus business registry to solve a few difficult 
cases. In a total of 7 cases, most of them corresponding to the first years of the period under study, 
there remained some doubts as to whether a firm was a MNE or not. In all of them, the firm was 
declared not to be a MNE, what seemed to be the more likely case. 
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Table 3 reports the relative frequencies (in percentage terms) of the type of 
applicant conditional on the type of internationalization (note that the sum of the 
percentages by columns is always equal to 100%). At the bottom of the Table we also 
report the relative share of the types of internationalization, both in the sample and in the 
population. Around 90% of the patents that are only of the InvApp type (and not of the 
InvInv and/or AppApp type) are the result of the activity of MNE. In most cases, MNE file 
through their headquarters, and only in 4.57% of the cases (corresponding to 5.2% of the 
"InvApp only" applications filed by MNE), the applicant is a MNE subsidiary from a 
country different from the home country. One implication of the fact that MNEs mostly file 
through their headquarters is that the number of international patents that escape our 
definition of internationalization because they are the result of the filing of a MNE 
subsidiary abroad, and of the work of inventors that are all from the same foreign country – 
remember our discussion in the previous section – is likely to be negligible. Note that none 
of the 300 applications, that are of the InvApp type only, was filed by a person, by a public 
research institute, or by a university. 
The next three columns of Table 3 show the share of the different types of 
applicants for international patents that, besides being of the InvApp type, also present 
InvInv or AppApp internationalization, or both. From the percentages reported at the 
bottom of the Table (both for the sample, and for the whole population of international 
patents), it can be seen that there are only few occurrences of applicant internationalization 
(less than 9% of international patents, in the population).  For international patents that also 
display inventor and, in particular, applicant internationalization, the relative share of 
MNEs is smaller. We also observe that the only filings by universities and by public 
research institutes in the sample always involve the presence of inventors that are from 
different countries and, in a very few cases, also the collaboration of applicants from 
different countries. A Pearson 2χ  test shows that the relative importance of each type of 
applicant is not independent to the type of internationalization, implying that the 
differences that we have commented upon are statistically significant overall.  
Next we consider whether there is a relation between the type of applicant and 
their filing strategies. We distinguish between three types of patents in terms of the filing 
strategy of their applicants: 1) patent applications that are never filed to the EPO; 2) patent 
applications that receive their priority filing at the EPO; and 3) patent applications that, 
while receiving a priority at any of the EU27 national patent offices, are eventually 
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mentioned as prior applications that are also filed at the EPO.  Table 4 shows the results. 
The bottom of the Table indicates that about one third of all international patents never 
reach the EPO. Indeed, as we discussed in the previous section, only focusing on the EPO 
excludes much relevant inventive activity. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
We find that MNEs have a higher propensity than other firms to first file to the 
EPO. On the other hand, in our sample there is no university, research institute or person 
that applied first to the EPO. The relation is marginally insignificant, as the first of the two 
Pearson 
2χ  tests indicates. We observe that types of organizations that less frequently do 
their first filing to the EPO often do so later on, by means of successive filings of the same, 
or of related, inventions. This is shown in the far right column of Table 4, where we still 
observe a slightly higher share of MNEs.  As the second Pearson 
2χ  test indicates, 
however, this difference is not statistically significant.5 
 
We now focus our attention again on the whole population of patents, in order to 
assess the overall degree of internationalization of European inventive activity between 
1990 and 2004. To this end, we compute the relative measures of internationalization 
defined by Equations 8, 8', 9 and 9' of the previous section, aggregating the 27 countries 
that constitute the European Union. The results are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
                                                 
5  The stratified structure of the sample also allows us to consider any changes in time in the 
relations that we have discussed. Dividing the  time period under consideration into two intervals 
(1990-1997 and 1998-2004), we find that: a) the propensity to first file international patents to the 
EPO, instead than to a EU27 national patent office, is significantly greater in more recent years b) 
however, once successive filings are taken into consideration, while the fraction of application that 
eventually reaches the EPO is still higher in more recent years, a Pearson 2χ  test statistics does not 
reach conventional significance levels; c) we do not find any evidence that the composition of the 
type of applicant changes significantly between the first and the second part of the time period 
considered.  
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All measures indicate a degree of internationalization that is still rather modest, 
even though it has increased steadily since the early 1990s. Also, we observe important 
differences among the four alternative metrics, with the two relative measures of inventor-
applicant internationalization being well above the others. The first of the two (indicated in 
the Figure as InvApp | Inv) refers to patents that have European inventors and extra-
European applicants, and AppInv | App is the opposite. The typical case accounted for by 
the InvApp | Inv measure is the one of the extra-European MNE owning an R&D lab in 
Europe and filing the patents produced there through its headquarters in the home country. 
The fact that the first measure is higher than the second indicates the relatively high 
importance of extra-European applicants in European inventive activity. Applicant 
internationalization is very low, always below 1%, indicating that only in a very small 
minority of cases applicants from different countries jointly file an application. The 
measure of inventor internationalization at the end of the period is slightly above the 3% 
mark. 
Overall, these data allow us to declare that the degree of "globalization" in the 
production of technology, to refer again to the work of Patel and Pavitt (1991), has 
certainly increased since the time when they wrote, but is still rather low in relative terms.6  
 
4. A gravity model of international inventive activity 
 
The basic model that we estimate is the following: 
 
ijttjiijtjtitijt DTDDLdistAAINT εβββλββββ ++++++++= 6543210 )ln()ln()ln()ln(
 
                                                 
6  While in the previous Section we clarified that there are important differences between our 
measures of internationalization, and the ones in Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 
(2001), still it is useful to provide an example of how they compare to one another. When looking at 
the EPO, they find, for Germany and for the years 1993-1995, values of their measures SHAI, 
SHIA and SHII of respectively 6.3%, 4.5% and 6.6%. In the present case, the more directly 
comparable measure are equal, for the year 1994, to 2.0%, 1.9% and 0.6%. The difference is 
probably attributable mainly to the fact that the EPO afforded, particularly in those early years, a 
very biased sample of European inventive activity, as it was discussed in the previous section.  
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where ln is the natural log, ijtINT is one of the three bilateral measures of 
internationalization of inventive activity, A is the "inventive mass" of each country, to be 
proxied with appropriate patent statistics, dist  is the distance between the capital cities of 
pairs of countries (computed with the great circle formula) and L  is a vector of other 
conditioning variables. It includes dummies for the presence of common borders and of a 
common language7 (with no variation in time), and for the inclusion in the European Union 
and in the European Monetary Union (with variations in time for several of the countries 
considered). We include two more time-varying variables in L. One is a multiplicative term 
of logged distance and of a time trend, to assess whether any time distance effect varies in 
time. The other is an indicator of pairwise "inventive proximity". It is computed as the  
correlation between two vectors, one for each country, formed by the number of patent 
priority applications in each of the eight IPC technology classes.8 The two D  variables are 
country-specific fixed effects, one for each country, and the variable DT  is meant to 
capture any time shock affecting all bilateral relations.9 This specification is quite flexible, 
including all possible fixed effects, short of estimating a Fixed-Effects panel model.10 
Flexibility is also added by pooling observations from different years, instead of summing 
them over periods of a few years, as is sometimes done in the literature. The presence of a 
                                                 
7    The language dummy takes fractional values for multilingual countries. For example, it is equal 
to one half between Belgium and France (the presence of a small German speaking minority in 
Belgium is ignored), and to one third for the pairs of Switzerland with Germany, France and Italy. 
8     These are the eight top "sections" (A through H) of the International Patent Classification (IPC) 
taxonomy. See http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/ (last visited on 1 December 2008). The 
correlations are computed for each year on the same dataset used for all the exercises carried out in 
the paper. Fractional counting is adopted to address all the cases when more than one IPC category 
is assigned to a patent. 
9  Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) explain bilateral relations using a model 
that, among other differences with respect to ours, does not include distance among the regressors 
(so that it is not a “gravity model”). 
10  A Fixed Effect model, in its Least Square Dummy Variable representation, would simply 
obtain by also including dummies indexed i,j, that is, one for each statistical unit of the model.  In 
this case, the parameters would be identified uniquely by the time variation of the data. All time-
invariant variables (such as distance, and most likely candidates for inclusion into the L vector) 
would be swept away by the fixed effects, so that the model would be of very little empirical 
interest. 
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year dummy variable controls for the presence of time shocks affecting all pairwise 
relations in the same way.  
The model is first estimated using OLS, both incorporating the whole set of pairwise 
measures of internationalization, and also limited to those that include only the countries 
that are currently members of the European Union. This is meant to address the asymmetric 
treatment among European and non-European countries, the latter being affected by a home 
bias effect because we only consider European patent offices.11 In most cases, however, 
both samples provide qualitatively similar results. One problem in the estimation of gravity 
models derives from the presence of cases when pairs of countries do not entertain any 
relation – be it of trade or, as in our case, of inventive activity. Given that the model is 
expressed in logs, all these occurrences generate missing values, and the ensuing truncation 
of the dependent variable could be a source of biased estimates. To address this problem, 
we also adopt the two-step procedure introduced by Heckman, popularly known as the 
Heckit estimator (Heckman 1979). When interpreting the results, in the few cases when the 
OLS and the Heckit estimators suggest conflicting conclusions, the Heckit estimates will be 
privileged.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 shows the estimates of the gravity model on InvAppij.12 Distance is found to 
negatively affect international collaboration. In all cases, we also find that this effect 
                                                 
11  In principle, other patent offices could be included in the construction of the data, up to the 
whole set currently covered by Patstat. However, the degree of complexity of the computations as 
they are is already quite high. To produce the results of this paper, starting from the output of 60 
SQL queries (four for each year considered, producing a total of more than 13 million records), a set 
of 19 Stata ".do files" run sequentially, with a total execution time of approximately 30 hours using 
a small workstation. Secondly, the use of Patstat still requires much care, because at times the data 
present idiosyncrasies that require careful examination. A line had to be drawn somewhere. 
12  In this and in all following cases, the first step of the Heckit estimator, a Probit describing 
the selection into the sample, used the same list of dependent variables of the gravity model, 
excluding the measures of inventive activity and the interaction between logged distance and time, 
plus GDP based on purchasing power parity, expressed at current dollars, taken from IMF's World 
Economic Outlook Database (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28, last accessed on 1 
December 2008). 
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increased over time, as is indicated by the negative and significant impact of the cross-
product of distance with the time trend. The last line of Table 5 shows, for the Heckit 
estimates only, the implied elasticities of internationalization with respect to distance, for 
the first and for the last year of the period under consideration. They range from -47% to -
60% for the whole sample of countries, and from -32% to -82% for the sample of European 
countries. 
Having a common border, sharing a common language and having more similar 
technologies has a significantly positive effect on international inventive collaboration, as 
does being a member of the European Union, when the analysis is constrained to the EU27 
sample.  It is particularly interesting to observe that the impact of the Euro Zone variable is 
estimated to be negative in the Heckit estimates, and significant in the full sample case, and 
not far from it in the reduced sample.  
 
Table 6 shows the estimates of the gravity model on the InvInvij measure of 
internationalization.13  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
We highlight the most relevant differences with respect to the previous estimates, 
most of which are similar. The elasticity of distance is now estimated to be more modest, 
up to -46%, in the last year and for the whole sample. The negative effect of distance 
significantly increases in time in both samples, with magnitudes that are not too different 
from those that we found in the previous case. Having a common border has a more 
pronounced effect than before. Being part of the Euro Zone now has a significantly positive 
effect in the reduced sample, and an insignificant effect in the broader sample. 
 
                                                 
13  Here the number of non-zero observations (equal to 4276 and 2726 respectively for the 
whole sample and for the EU27 selection) is greater than in the previous case (3958 and 2448, 
respectively). This does not contradict our assertion that the InvApp measure is the more "general" 
of the three (see also Figure 1). In fact, as the fictitious example of Table 1 also shows, InvAppij 
may be smaller than the corresponding InvInvij (or AppAppij) and, in particular, InvAppij may be 
equal to zero when the other two measures are not.  
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 Finally, we present the estimates of the gravity model on AppAppij. This measure 
involves a relatively modest number of cases, being defined by rare collaborations between 
applicants residing in different countries.14 The results, shown in Table 7, indicate that the 
negative role of distance, while still being significant, is weaker compared to the previous 
cases. For the whole sample, we find a negative effect of distance, but we do not find 
evidence that it increased over time (to the opposite, the estimated coefficient of the product 
of logged distance with time is positive, even if of modest magnitude and insignificant). For 
the reduced sample, we find that the elasticity of distance increases from approximately 
zero at the beginning of the period, to about -43% at the end.15  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
A smaller role for distance is also indicated by the fact that the estimated coefficient 
on the border dummy, while being negative and significant, is of smaller magnitude than in 
the two previous cases. The estimated effect of sharing the same language is positive and 
significant. The effect of belonging to the EU is positive and significant for the smaller 
sample, while the effect of belonging to the Euro Zone is estimated to be positive in both 
cases. 
 
5.  Discussion 
 
 From our results, it emerges unambiguously that distance negatively affects the 
internationalization of R&D activities, with estimated elasticities that, at their highest, are 
about half of what is usually found in the literature on international trade. It is quite likely 
that the costs of travel alone are not able to explain this effect – just as they do not explain 
the negative effect of distance on international trade. It could well be that what really 
                                                 
14  This also may explain why in this case the differences between the OLS and the Heckit 
estimates are more important than before: the lower is the ratio of non-zero observations, the more 
likely it is that OLS estimates will be prone to a sample selection bias. 
15  Please note that while the estimated coefficient of the log of distance is insignificant, the 
logged distance and the cross product of logged distance with time are jointly significant, with a p-
value smaller that 1%.  
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matters is what may be seen as a measure of loosely defined "cultural" distance. The 
success of R&D activities rests upon the smooth functioning of many tasks that are not 
limited to research activities proper, but also include, for example, the building of the 
necessary infrastructure and the protection of the intellectual assets that are eventually 
produced. Since the necessary mutual understanding among all parties involved may be 
guaranteed only in part through contractual arrangements, tacit agreements end up playing 
an important role. Arguably, the further away two cultures are, the more difficult it is for 
tacit agreements to be honored, and the more problematic is collaboration.16  
The physical distance variable could then proxy for this "cultural distance" element 
which is missing from our model. Many impediments to international collaboration have 
decreased over the last decades and, among them, the cost of travel. These changes are 
reflected in the overall increase in internationalization that emerges from our data (see 
Figure 2). During the same period, arguably, cultural distances have remained roughly 
constant, so that their relative importance, as captured by the estimated coefficient of the 
cross-product of distance with time, has increased.  
 In Europe, the overall process of integration has reduced many of the impediments 
to international R&D collaboration. We observe that belonging to the European Union has 
a strong and significant positive effect on internationalization. The results that we obtain on 
the impact of belonging to the Euro Zone are best seen in the light of the debate that 
followed the contribution of Rose (2001), who found a significant and economically very 
strong positive effect of currency zones on international trade. Later studies tended to 
confirm the presence of such an effect, but they significantly reduced its estimated size. The 
lively debate that followed is summarized well in Baldwin (2006), who also finds some 
positive effects of currency unions on trade – the Euro Zone among them. One important 
reason why we should be prudent in commenting on estimates of the effects of the Euro 
Zone is because, quite simply, it is still a relatively recent innovation and we have not 
observed its effects for long enough to allow for robust statistical inferences. This 
consideration is also the starting point for an interpretation of our results. 
                                                 
16  A survey of senior executives representing a wide range of industries, carried out by The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2007), indicated “cultural differences” as the third most important risk 
to developing global innovation networks (the first and the second one being, respectively, theft of 
intellectual property, and loss of control over innovation processes).  
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The estimated effects of belonging to the Euro Zone are different according to what 
measure of internationalization we consider. It is negative for the more general concept of 
Inventor-Applicant internationalization, and positive for our two more restrictive measures. 
A possible explanation of this contrast may be the following. Not all of the reasons that 
may lead to establishing an R&D lab abroad derive from considerations that have a strictly 
technological or economic nature. For example, an R&D presence abroad may also serve 
public relations purposes, and in some extreme cases, it may even be a precondition 
imposed by the local authorities in order for them to allow the establishment of a 
production unit. It could be that countries within the Euro Zone now find a less urgent need 
to set up laboratories in other countries that also belong to the currency union, and as a 
consequence can choose the location for their labs using criteria of choice that are strictly 
technological and economic in nature. More generally, we posit that beyond a certain level 
of functional or institutional integration, economic actors may have a less stringent need to 
establish their presence abroad in order to carry out a specific function.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have discussed the extent, and researched the causes of, 
internationalization of innovative activities, using a dataset on priority patent applications 
filed at any patent office in the European Union. We found that the degree of 
internationalization of innovative activities, while steadily increasing over time, is still 
relatively limited. Such a lasting "lack of globalization" may come as a surprise, at least if it 
is observed in the light of the amazing intricacy of the relations that govern today's 
international division of labour. In discussing our results we have stayed clear of the debate 
on exactly what is the nature of the emerging forms of global R&D efforts. Types of more 
“open” innovation, as described in Chesbrough (2003), are quite likely to be part of the 
story. However, adopting catchphrases to describe complex realities is risky and, in the case 
at hand, may conduce to confusion between the conceptually distinct ideas of “openness” 
and “internationalization” of innovative processes17. The whole issue, while certainly 
deserving the attention of researchers, was outside of the scope of our work.  
                                                 
17  For example, for some firms, constructing an ecosystem conducive to open models of 
innovation may be an alternative to more traditional off-shoring of tightly controlled R&D labs. 
That is, in some cases we may observe more openness leading to less internationalization. Evidence 
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We studied the factors that determine the observed level of internationalization 
using a gravity model.  We found that sharing a common language positively affects the 
degree of collaboration, as does being a member of the European Union. It is not possible 
to disentangle the relative role of the different ingredients that together define the European 
Union. Obvious candidates would be the presence of a common market, the presence of a 
common regulatory framework, and innovation policy instruments that encourage 
collaboration among actors residing in different EU countries.18 
It also emerged that being part of the Euro Zone affects the extent of 
internationalization. In the case of the more restrictive inventor and applicant 
internationalization, the influence is estimated to be positive, although not very strong. This 
evidence adds to literature that, over the last few years, has tried to estimate the effect of 
currency unions on international trade, and it suggests that a currency union may have a 
positive effect on other types of international interactions besides trade. However, 
surprisingly, we also found evidence of a negative effect of the Euro Zone on the more 
general inventor-applicant measure of internationalization. We proposed a tentative 
explanation of this apparent puzzle, which boils down to a simple observation: in some 
cases, the desire of economic actors to be “present” in far away places, may derive from the 
fact that integration is not high enough. 
Distance unambiguously affects internationalization negatively, more so in more 
recent years. As it emerged in studied carried out in different contexts, we also conclude 
that the rumors about the death of distance have been greatly exaggerated. This finding has 
an important policy implication in Europe. One of the explicit policy goals of the European 
Commission is to encourage the formation of a “European research area”.19 In order to 
avoid a situation where the desired type of international integration only arises between 
                                                                                                                                                     
on emerging models of open innovation, mostly seen from the point of view of internationalization, 
is in OECD (2008). 
18  An example of a European policy instrument that forces the collaboration of innovators 
from different countries of the European Union is the Seventh Framework Programme. 
19  See for example the home page of European Commission’s DG Research (the Directorate 
General responsible for Science, Research and Technology), declaring that “European Research, 
and more specifically the creation of a European Research Area, are now high on the policy agenda 
in Europe”. (http://ec.europa.eu/research/index.cfm?pg=why&lg=en . Last accessed on 1 December 
2008). 
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countries that share a border and a language, or are relatively close to one another, 
innovators in member states that are relatively far apart must be provided with stronger 
incentives to collaborate.  This does not happen currently. 
We have estimated the role of distance, and we have posited that broadly defined 
cultural differences, which correlate with geographic distance, may play a role in 
explaining our findings. Obtaining a better understanding of what aspects of distance hinder 
the internationalization of R&D activities, besides being interesting in its own right, would 
help guide the policy maker.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  Fractional counts of three fictitious patents 
 
 
 
Table 2. Computation of measures of internationalization of three fictitious patents 
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Table 3. Type of applicant vs. type of internationalization. Sample of 300 international 
patents 
 
 Type of internationalization 
 
Type of applicant 
Only 
InvApp 
InvApp 
and: 
Only InvInv Only AppApp InvInv & 
AppApp 
Firm 10.29%  13.59% 22.22% 15.38% 
MNE HQ 67.43%  55.34% 44.44% 53.85% 
MNE SUB HQ 17.71%  12.62% 27.78% 115.38% 
MNE SUB 4.57%  5.83% 5.56% - 
Person -  1.94% - - 
Public Res Inst -  7.77% - 7.69% 
University -  2.91% - 7.69% 
 
Sums by column 100%  100% 100% 100% 
 
% in sample (n=300) 58.33%  34.33% 3.00% 4.33% 
% in population  (N=72291) 54.26%  36.30% 3.86% 5.57% 
Pearson 2χ  (18 degrees of freedom) =  35.09   P-value = 0.009 
 
Legend: 
Type of applicant:  A "Firm" is any firm, which is not a multinational corporation, or does not 
belong to one. MNE HQ: the Headquarter (HQ) of a MNE. MNE SUB: the subsidiary of a MNE 
which is registered in a country different from HQ. MNE SUB HQ: the subsidiary of a MNE which 
is registered in the same country as the HQ. Person: a physical person. Public Res Inst: Research 
institute that are financed mostly by public administrations. University: Universities. 
Type of internationalization: see Section 2. 
Pearson 2χ  test on the independence of the two characters. Value of the test statistic and P-value 
are relative to the null hypothesis of independence. 
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Table 4. Type of applicant vs. Patent office of first filing. Sample of 300 international 
patents 
 
 Patent office of first filing  
Type of applicant EPO: 
never 
EPO: first 
filing 
 
EPO: first 
filing 
and/or later 
Firm 13.04% 9.68% 12.26% 
MNE HQ 60.87% 63.44% 62.26% 
MNE SUB HQ 14.01% 21.51% 15.09% 
MNE SUB 4.83% 5.38% 43.77% 
Person 0.97% - 0.94% 
Public Res Inst 4.35% - 3.77% 
University 1.93% - 1.89% 
 
Sums by column 100% 100% 100% 
    
% in sample (n=300) 33.66% 31.00% 35.33% 
% in population (N=72291) 35.16% 31.10% 33.73% 
a) Pearson 2χ  (6 degrees of freedom) =  9.66   P-value = 0.140 
b) Pearson 2χ  (6 degrees of freedom) =  4.60   P-value = 0.596 
 
Legend:  
Type of applicant: see note in Table 1 above 
Type of office of first filing: EPO: European Patent Office; Not EPO: any other EU27 national 
patent office. Pearson 2χ  test on the independence of: a) Ho: Type of applicant independent of 
"EPO never vs. EPO first filing"; b) Ho: Type of applicant independent of "EPO never vs. EPO first 
filing and/or later" the two characters. Value of the test statistic and P-value are relative to the null 
hypothesis of independence.  
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Table  5.  Regression results: InvApp 
All countries EU25 only Dep variable: 
 ln( ijInvApp ) OLS Heckit OLS Heckit 
ln(agginv_x) .0785 
0.116 
.2394 
0.000 
.0768 
0.796 
.2110 
0.008 
ln(aggapp_y) .1672 
0.007 
.2851 
0.000 
.3057 
0.001 
.4135 
0.000 
ln(dist) -.2594 
0.000 
-.4674 
0.000 
-.0401 
0.653 
-.2935 
0.001 
ln(dist)*time -.0071 
0.077 
-.0074 
0.064 
-.0321 
0.000 
-.0279 
0.000 
border .5880 
0.000 
.6830 
0.000 
.4782 
0.000 
.5490 
0.000 
language 1.0808 
0.000 
1.2212 
0.000 
1.2022 
0.000 
1.4158 
0.000 
EU Union .0797 
0.259 
.0702 
0.304 
.5757 
0.000 
.5060 
0.000 
Euro Zone -.1410 
0.061 
-.1740 
0.019 
-.0589 
0.467 
-.1160 
0.150 
Techproximity .4493 
0.000 
.4561 
0.000 
.6945 
0.000 
.7562 
0.000 
n 3958 3958 2448 2448 
R2 0.6157  0.6334  
λ   .7831  .6797 
Distance 
elasticity,  
1990 and 2004: 
 -0.471,  -0.603  -0.319,  -0.816 
 
Note for Tables 5, 6 and 7. 
λ  expresses the relative importance of the truncation of the dependent variable in the Heckman 
(1979) estimator. 
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Table  6. Regression results: InvInv 
 
 
All countries 
 
EU25 only Dep variable:  
ln( ijInv ) 
 OLS Heckit OLS Heckit 
ln(agginv_x) .2012 
0.000 
.3180 
0.000 
.0800 
0.155 
.1800 
0.005 
ln(agginv_y) .2012 
0.000 
.3180 
0.000 
.0800 
0.155 
.1800 
0.005 
ln(dist) -.2300 
0.000 
-.3148 
0.000 
-.0952 
0.169 
-.2419 
0.000 
ln(dist)*time -.0053 
0.090 
-.0077 
0.016 
-.0031 
0.000 
-.0265 
0.000 
border .8906 
0.000 
.9557 
0.000 
.6368 
0.000 
.7026 
0.000 
language 1.0424 
0.000 
1.1681 
0.000 
1.4030 
0.000 
1.5748 
0.000 
EU Union .2741 
0.000 
.2535 
0.000 
.4906 
0.000 
.4552 
0.000 
Euro Zone .06181 
0.305 
.0151 
0.800 
.2193 
0.001 
.1548 
0.015 
Techproximity .1477 
0.061 
.1579 
0.046 
.3415 
0.001 
.3689 
0.000 
n 4276 4276 2726 2726 
R2 0.6534  0.6792  
λ   .5470  .5155 
Distance 
elasticity,  
1990 and 2004: 
 -0.320,  -0.458  -0.267,  -0.739 
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Table  7.  Regression results: AppApp 
 
 
All countries EU25 only Dep variable: 
 ln( ijApp ) OLS Heckit OLS Heckit 
ln(aggapp_x) .1057 
0.102 
.2502 
0.000 
.0322 
0.689 
.1203 
0.150 
ln(aggapp_y) .1057 
0.102 
.2502 
0.000 
.0322 
0.689 
.1203 
0.150 
ln(dist) -.0123 
0.822 
-.2238 
0.000 
.3127 
0.000 
.0528 
0.542 
ln(dist)*time .0048 
0.231 
.0047 
0.223 
-.0259 
0.001 
-.0254 
0.001 
border .4763 
0.000 
.6871 
0.000 
.4536 
0.000 
.6077 
0.000 
language .9898 
0.000 
1.164 
0.000 
1.0911 
0.000 
1.3676 
0.000 
EU Union -.0129 
0.868 
-.0687 
0.337 
.1860 
0.059 
.1343 
0.142 
Euro Zone .1083 
0.150 
.1571 
0.029 
.3497 
0.000 
.4306 
0.000 
Techproximity .1216 
0.293 
.2304 
0.050 
.2821 
0.061 
.3290 
0.028 
n 2146 2146 1328 1328 
R2 0.543  0.5805  
λ   .8229  .7297 
Distance 
elasticity,  
1990 and 2004: 
 -0.218,  -0.134  +.027,  -0.427 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Relations among the different types of internationalization 
 
 
 
Legend: Rectangle: all patents; InvApp: all international patents necessarily display (also) Inventor-
Applicant internationalization 
 
Figure 2. International patent, EU27, national averages 
0
2
4
6
%
 o
f i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l p
at
en
ts
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Years
InvInv | Inv AppApp | App
InvApp | Inv AppInv | App
 
 
Note: InvInv | Inv: Eq. 8; AppApp | App: Eq. 8'; InvApp | Inv: Eq. 9; AppInv | App: Eq. 9' 
Source of the data: Analysis of the Patstat database (April 2008 release) (See Section 3 for a 
description). 
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